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This study examines how a firm’s cost of equity is affected by industry peer 
firms’ earnings quality. First, using Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2007) as a 
theoretical basis, I predict and provide evidence that higher industry peer firms’ 
earnings quality reduces a firm’s cost of equity via the systematic market risk. Second, 
the negative association is more pronounced for the subsample with high industry peer 
earnings quality. Third, the cost of equity effect of industry peer firm earnings quality is 
mitigated by multinational operations and higher profitability relative to industry peers. 
These findings are consistent with the theory that industry peer firms’ earnings quality 
changes the cost of equity by affecting investors’ assessed covariance of the firm’s 
expected future cash flows with that of other firms. Overall, my study contributes to a 




CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the association between a firm’s cost of equity and industry 
peer firms’ earnings quality.
1
 In a multi-securities setting, Lambert, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2007) (hereafter LLV) identify paths through which not only a firm’s but 
also peer firms’ information quality affects the firm’s cost of equity. Specifically, 
investors’ assessment of a firm’s value is affected by information contained in both the 
firm’s and also peer firms’ financial reports (e.g., Foster [1981]).
2
 As the firm’s and/or 
peer firms’ information quality increases, investors receive less noisy signals of the 
firm’s and peer firms’ future cash flows. LLV suggest that these more accurate signals 
translate into lower (investors’) assessed covariance of the firm’s expected future cash 
flows with the cash flows of other firms and thus lower cost of equity.
3
 Because 
earnings are the main resource of firm-specific accounting information (e.g. Biddle et al. 
[1995]; Liu et al. [2002]), I expect that peer firms’ high earnings quality reduces the 




Peer firm earnings quality is measured as either equally-weighted or market-
share-weighted earnings quality of all industry peers. LLV define information quality 
                                                          
1
 By industry peer firms, I refer to firms in the same industry.  
2
 LLV’s theory is applicable to firms whose values are correlated. My study concentrates on the cost of 
equity effects of industry peer firm earnings quality, because according to prior literature (e.g., Foster 
[1981], King [1966], Grinold, Rudd and Stefek[1989]), industry peer firms’ expected cash flows are 
significantly correlated, and industry captures a substantial portion of stock return co-movement. For 
instance, Roll (1992) suggests that an industry factor explains up to 40 percent of the total stock return 
volatilities. 
3
 The capital market pricing model (CAPM) suggests the cost of equity is a positive function of the 
covariance of the firm’s expected future cash flows with the expected cash flows of other firms in the 
market. 
4
 LLV’s implication is that either a firm’s or peer firms’ high information quality moves the cost of equity 
toward the risk free rate. If the unconditional covariance of a firm’s cash flows and other firms’ cash 
flows is positive, then high information quality reduces the cost of equity; otherwise, high information 
quality increases the cost of equity. On average, firms’ (especially industry peers’) unconditional 
covariances are expected to be positive (e.g., Foster [1981]).  
2 
 
based on the precision of the information about firm performance/value. To match this 
definition, I utilize a peer firm earnings quality measure based on Francis et al. (2005). 
This measure reflects the extent to which peer firms’ accruals map into cash flows in 
the prior, current, and future periods or into changes in revenues and property, plant, 
and equipment. Low peer firm earnings quality can be due to either peer firms’ 
estimation errors or intentional manipulations. Therefore, this earnings quality measure 
meets the requirement of LLV. 
I use three proxies for the cost of equity. The early financial economics literature 
measure a firm’s ex ante expected returns based on realized (ex post) excess stock 
returns. I adopt this measure as one approach to estimate a firm’s cost of equity. 
However, prior studies (e.g., Sharpe [1978]; Elton [1999]) suggest that, due to 
unexpected exogenous shocks, realized returns can be significantly different from ex 
ante expected returns. The second measure I use is the implied cost of equity derived 
from analyst earnings forecasts (e.g., Easton [2004]). By definition, the implied cost of 
equity is the discount rate that investors use to calculate the present value of a firm’s 
expected future cash flows. This measure is not affected by noises in ex post realized 
returns, but its reliability can be reduced by biases in analyst forecasts (e.g., McInnis 
[2010]). Therefore, I use a third measure of cost of equity based on the industry-
adjusted earning-price ratio (Francis et al. [2005]). This measure does not rely on either 
analyst forecasts or realized returns. 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2010, my analyses provide 
empirical evidence consistent with expectation. With respect to realized excess returns, 
I conduct regressions on four common risk factors (market factor [MKTRF], size factor 
3 
 
[SMB], value factor [HML] and momentum factor [UMD]).  Significant results suggest 
that observations with peer firm earnings quality above the median have a 14.5 to 17.5 
percent lower market beta (i.e., the loading of firm excess return on market excess 
return). Assuming a 6% market risk premium per year, this effect translates into an 87 
to 105 basis point lower cost of equity. Interestingly, I find the market risk effects of 
both earnings quality and peer firm earnings quality are more pronounced when the 
market excess return is negative (I discuss this finding and other related analyses later). 
High peer firm earnings quality also has a significant negative effect on the implied cost 
of equity and the industry-adjusted earning-price ratio. For example, observations with 
peer firm earnings quality above the median have a 50 basis-point lower implied cost of 
equity. The conclusions are robust to controlling for other variables known to affect 
firm risk and the cost of equity (leverage, firm size, operating cash flows, cash flow 
volatility, and book-to-market ratio). In summary, my findings are theory-consistent and 
economically significant. 
I extend the analyses by examining variations in the sensitivity of the cost of 
equity to peer firm earnings quality. Extending the analysis in LLV, I expect industry 
peer firms’ higher earnings quality to reduce a firm’s cost of equity at an increasing 
marginal rate (see section 5.1). I find the negative association between cost of equity 
effects and peer firm earnings quality is more pronounced for the subsample with 
relatively higher peer firm earnings quality, consistent with expectation. Further, the 
theory requires the cost of equity effect of peer firm earnings quality to be dampened by 
low unconditional covariances. Supporting the theory, the cost of equity effects of peer 
firm earnings quality are mitigated for multinational firms which are geographically 
4 
 
diversified and firms with higher profitability relative to industry peers (see section 5.2 
for details). These firms have returns that are expected to be unconditionally less 
sensitive to market/industry-level news (e.g., Hao et al. [2011]).  
Noting variations in the cost of equity effects of peer firm earnings quality is 
important for at least two reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, it helps us 
explain and predict investor and stock price behavior. Second, from the research design 
perspective, it enhances the internal validity of my study and alleviates concerns about 
potential omitted variables (see Rajan and Zingales [1998]; Lang and Maffett [2010]).  
For example, Easley and O’Hara (2004) may argue that peer firms’ high earnings 
quality could also possibly reduce a firm’s cost of capital by decreasing information 
asymmetry among investors rather than the assessed covariances. However, those other 
models (e.g., Easley and O’Hara [2004]) generally have no predictions consistent with 
the increasing effect or the moderating role of multinational operations.
5 
Therefore, 
testing theses variations could also largely exclude other explanations alternative to 
LLV. 
Overall, I summarize the findings above as peer firm earnings quality having 
significant cost of equity effects that are consistent with a current theoretical framework 
(LLV) in which information quality affects investors assessed covariance of the firm’s 
cash flows with that of other firms. 
This study’s motivations and contributions can be summarized in the following 
three major perspectives. The first motivation for my study is the current theory in LLV. 
                                                          
5
 For example, Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest the ratio of private information to public information 
affects a firm’s cost of equity. Multinational firms have more complicated operating environments that 
are likely to create information asymmetry between investors and managers. Thus, Easley and O’Hara 
(2004) should expect the cost of equity effect of peer firm’s earnings quality to be greater for 
multinational firms, inconsistent with my findings.  Therefore, it is hard to provide an explanation based 
on the model in Easley and O’Hara (2004) for the evidence on the direct effect.   
5 
 
The cost of equity effect of information quality has been an important issue in the 
accounting literature for decades (Beyeret al. [2010]). The early theories (e.g., Amihud 
and Mendelson [1986]; Easley and O’Hara [2004]) provide several possible links 
between information quality and the cost of equity, but these effects are primarily 
established in single-security settings and possibly diversifiable in a large economy 
(Hughes, Liu and Liu [2007]).
6
 In a multi-securities setting, LLV identify the effects of 
information quality on the cost of equity via systematic risk, which is not diversifiable 
even as the number of securities and investors become large. Therefore, it is important 
to understand the validity of LLV, especially given the mixed empirical evidence 
provided by prior studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. [2009] find evidence in favor of 
LLV, while Ogneva et al. [2007] do not). To the best of my knowledge, prior empirical 
tests on LLV predominantly focus on the link between a firm’s cost of equity and its 
own information quality. My study provides the first empirical evidence that a firm’s 
cost of equity depends not only on its own but also on peer firms’ information quality, 
supporting LLV. Importantly, the analyses on variations in the effects of peer firms’ 
information quality are also consistent with LLV. The study answers the call by Beyer 
et al. (2010) for more research on the cost of equity through testing the effect of 
information quality on the undiversifiable (systematic) component of asset risk. 
The second motivation is the fact that institutions such as the SEC and FASB are 
concerned about the capital market consequences of existing and future regulations that 
could potentially change the quality of firms’ financial reports (e.g., LLV). For example, 
Levitt (1998, p.81), the former SEC chairman suggested that “high quality accounting 
                                                          
6
 Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop their model in a multiple firm setting. But, Easley and O’Hara 
(2004) limited the number of firms in the economy. Hughes, Liu and Liu (2007) suggest the effect in 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) is diversifiable when the number of assets becomes very large. 
6 
 
standards …. reduce capital costs” and thus benefit the whole economy.
 
To a firm’s 
investors, high quality accounting standards increase not only the firm’s but also peer 
firms’ information quality. Thus, my study contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding of regulations that change a large number of firms’ information quality.  
Further, conventional financial economics theories view positive externalities of 
financial information quality as a possible justification for financial reporting regulation 
(e.g., Dye [1990]; Beyer et al. [2010]). In the presence of externalities, profit-
maximizing firms tradeoff only the firm-specific benefits and costs of high quality 
financial reporting and not the social values or costs (e.g., Ross [1979]; Milgrom [1981]; 
Grossman [1981]; Leuz and Wysocki [2008]).
7
 If the externalities are positive (e.g., a 
firm’s cost of equity can be lowered by peer firm’s earnings quality), Admati and 
Pfeiderer (2000) suggest that a firm would wish to free ride on other firms’ high quality 
financial reporting but not provide high quality information for investors to assess other 
firms. Their theory further suggests deficiencies caused by the positive externality could 
be effectively mitigated by 1) proper regulations requiring a minimum level of financial 
reporting quality or 2) subsidies that reduce the perceived cost of high quality financial 
reporting. However, if the externalities are negative, firms will compete with each other 
in financial reporting quality, thus leading their financial reporting quality to be higher 
than the socially optimal level. To cope with deficiencies caused by this negative 
externality, the theory (Fishman and Hagerty [1989]) suggests that in contrast to the 
traditional wisdom, socially responsible regulators should impose limits to prevent 
                                                          
7
 The classic financial economics theories cast doubt on the use of the firm-specific effect of information 
quality in evaluating regulations. These studies argue that, since firms can voluntarily enforce high 
quality reporting and make decisions in their best interest, regulations may not be necessary (e.g., Ross 
[1979]; Grossman [1981]; Milgrom [1981]). Therefore, analyses on firm-specific effects may not be 
enough for assessing the need for financial reporting regulation. 
7 
 
firms from overinvesting in improving financial reporting quality. Though I do not 
empirically test the consequences of the externalities (i.e., either free-ride or over-
investment), my study provides evidence consistent with the existence of a positive 
externality of financial information quality. The finding supports the positive externality 
based rationale for regulations that enforce high quality financial reporting.  
Third, my study shows the cost of equity effects of peer firm earnings quality 
depend on a firm’s relative profitability and multinational operations. Thus, these 
analyses contribute to well-developed prior research on the economic consequences of 
these factors by showing additional channels through which these factors can influence 
a firm’s value. 
The next section reviews the relevant theories and lays out the hypothesis. 
Section 3 presents the research design and sample selection. Section 4 discusses 
primary empirical findings and Section 5 explains additional findings. Finally, Section 6 




CHAPTER II. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Theories on the Firm-Specific Effects of Information Quality  
Prior theoretical models provide several possible links between a firm’s 
information quality and its own cost of equity. In the secondary exchange market, 
investors need to be compensated for the risks of adverse selection, illiquidity, and large 
bid-ask spreads, resulting in a higher expected return or ex ante cost of equity (e.g., 
Amihud and Mendelson [1986]; Verrecchia [2001]; Garleanu and Pedersen [2004]). For 
example, Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest that high information asymmetry increases 
the probability for insiders to trade more profitably based on private information and 
thus imposes a risk on uninformed investors. This risk needs to be compensated in a 
form of increased cost of equity. One general feature of the models above is that they 
generally develop in a single-firm setting, and these firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk 
factors are likely to be diversified in “large economies” where investors can form 
portfolios of many stocks (Hughes, Liu and Liu [2007]). 
In a multi-securities setting, LLV identify both direct and indirect effects of 
information quality on the cost of equity. As discussed in more detail later, their model 
starts from a classical capital asset pricing model and builds on the information 
economics literature. Specifically, the direct effects exist because low information 
quality gives investors “a noisy signal of the realization of cash flows in the future” 
(LLV, 375). As the firm’s information quality improves, investors’ assessed 
covariances of a firm’s cash flows with the cash flows of other firms decrease, reducing 
the firm’s cost of equity through affecting the firm’s perceived systematic risk. The 
indirect effect happens because the firm’s earnings quality changes its real decisions 
9 
 
and distributions of cash flows. LLV show that the effect of information quality on 
covariances is theoretically undiversifiable even in large economies.  
 
Theories on the Externality of Information Quality 
In the presence of externalities, firms only tradeoff the firm-specific benefits and 
costs of high quality financial reporting but not the social benefits or costs (Coase 
[1960]; Admati and Pfleiderer [2000]).
8
 Then, regulations potentially improve the 
suboptimal social welfare caused by the externalities. Therefore, it is important to 
theoretically understand the externality of accounting information quality.  Knowledge 
about the externality potentially sheds light on the social value of regulating corporate 




CAPM in LLV 
LLV suggest their model sheds light on the externalities-based rationale for 
financial reporting regulations. In this section, I demonstrate the mechanisms of their 
model in detail. Under the assumptions of the standard capital asset pricing model, my 
analysis starts from the following equation adopted from LLV (p. 395). LLV show that 
firm j’s expected return is an increasing function of the covariance of firm j’s end-of-
period cash flow (Vj) with the sum of all firms’ end-of-period cash flows (Vk). Then, 
this expected return is further decomposed into two components: i) the firm’s own 
                                                          
8
 Social benefit (cost) refers to the benefit (cost) to society as a whole from the production of certain 
goods. Private benefit (cost) refers to the benefit (cost) to the producer of the goods.  If there is a negative 
(positive) externality, then social costs (benefits) will be greater than private costs (benefits).  
9
 For example, as discussed earlier, if there is a positive externality, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) suggest 
social values can be improved by regulations requiring a minimum level of financial reporting quality. 
10 
 
variance and ii) the firm’s covariances with other firms.
10
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  (LLV:U1)  
LLV suggest that firm j’s information quality can directly affect the expected 
returns through both the firm’s own variance and covariances with other firms. 
Similarly, as shown below, I also argue that peer firms’ information quality can directly 




Direct Effects through the Variance of the Firm’s Cash Flows 
The first channel is that high peer firm earnings quality directly moves firm j’s 
cost of equity to the risk free rate through reducing investors’ assessed variance of firm 
j’s cash flows. Following LLV, investors’ posterior expectation for end-of-period cash 


































 (LLV: U2)  
where V0j and ωj represent the ex ante expected value and ex ante precision of the end-
of-period cash flow, respectively. Investors receive Q pieces of information Zj1……. 
Zjq , which have implications for understanding firm j’s future cash flows. LLV suggest 
that firm j’s own variance is a negative function of γj, which is the precision of the Q 
pieces of information received. Therefore, as the information quality improves, the 
                                                          
10
 LLV do not number this equation. I use LLV:U1 as the number for this unnumbered equation. Equation 
LLV:U2 below is another unnumbered equation from LLV. In addition, equations numbered with “LLV:” 
refer to equations from LLV. 
11
 Different from LLV, the competition for price efficiency theory predicts that a firm’s price efficiency 
can be reduced by peer firms’ high earnings quality, possibly resulting in an increase in the firm’s cost of 
equity (Fishman and Hagerty [1989]). This effect could be diversified away in a large economy. 
11 
 
variance reduces. As different firms’ values are likely to be correlated, the financial 
information of peer firms is useful to investors in assessing the distribution of firm j’s 
expected future cash flows (Dye [1990]; Admati and Pfleiderer [2000]). Therefore, 
these peer firms’ earnings information should be included in the information set 
investors receive and use, and an increase in the precision (quality) of peer firms’ 
earnings information should reduce firm j’s own variance. However, LLV suggest that 
this firm-specific variance may be diversified away in large economies when both the 
number of securities and the number of investors are large. 
 
Direct Effects through the Covariance with Other Firms’ Cash Flows 
Though the variance effect above is theoretically diversifiable in large 
economies, peer firms’ earnings quality can also affect firm j’s covariances with other 
firms. To simplify the analyses, LLV assume a market with two securities, k and j. 
Information about firm k’s cash flows is Zk, and information about firm j’s cash flows is 
Zj.  These two firms are each other’s peer firm. They show that, conditional on firm j’s 































































 (LLV: 6) 
Where εj is the error contained in firm j’s information set, and therefore Var[εj] 
is an inverse measure of firm j’s information quality. This equation shows that a 
reduction in Var[εj] moves Cov(Vj,Vk| Zj) toward zero. However, as discussed in LLV 
(p. 400), whether the covariance is a positive or negative function of Var[εj] depends on 
the sign of Cov(Vj,Vk), the unconditional covariance. In other words, if the sign of 
12 
 
Cov(Vj,Vk) is positive (negative), then a reduction in Var[εj] decreases (increases) the 
conditional covariance to zero. Given the fact that the covariances of peer firms’ 
expected future cash flows are on average positive (e.g., Samuelson [1967]; Foster 
[1981]),
 12
 I expect that an improvement in firm j’s information quality, on average, 
decreases the firm k’s covariance with firm j. Because j and k are each other’s peer 
firm, the analyses above can be alternatively stated: as peer firm earnings quality 
increases, the assessed covariance of one firm with its peer firm decreases, reducing the 
firm’s cost of equity. Also importantly, LLV suggest that this covariance effect is not 
diversifiable even in large economies. 
 
Indirect Effects through Real Distributions of Expected Cash Flows 
Peer firm earnings quality can also indirectly affect a firm’s cost of equity in an 
un-diversifiable way by changing the real distributions of the firm’s and peer firms’ 
cash flows. For example, higher peer firm earnings quality may mitigate the agency 
problems in peer firms and thus increase peer firms’ expected future cash flows. Higher 
peer firm earnings quality can also change the expectation of the firm’s future cash 
flows by improving the firm’s real decisions in the product market (Verrecchia [2001]; 
Durnev and Mangen [2009]). These changes in the firm’s and peer firms’ expected cash 
flows will possibly further alter the covariances assessed by investors, resulting in an 
indirect effect on the cost of equity. The direction of this indirect effect, however, is 
unclear. In addition, the changes in the cost of equity, as indicated in both the direct and 
                                                          
12
 Basically, no observation in my sample continuously has negative Betas, or, in other words, 
unconditionally has negative Betas. 
13 
 
indirect effects above, would naturally change the firm’s optimal investment levels,
13
 
and the change in investment decisions could further have an indirect feedback effect on 
the cost of equity. This indirect feedback effect could lead to either lower cost of equity 
by reducing under-investment or higher cost of equity by increasing over-investment. 
Though the direction of theses indirect effects is uncertain, LLV suggest that the 
indirect effects are generally weaker than the direct ones. Therefore, the direct effect is 
expected to dominate, and, on average, a negative association between peer firm 
earnings quality and the cost of equity is predicted. 
 
Related Empirical Studies 
Industry-Level Stock Return Co-movement and Information Transfer 
LLV rely on the assumption that firms’ values are correlated. Prior finance 
studies (e.g., King [1966], Grinold, Rudd and Stefek [1989], Roll [1992]) suggest that 
industry captures a large portion of stock return co-movement. For example, Roll [1992] 
suggests that an industry factor can explain as high as 40 percent of stock-return 
volatility. Therefore, my study concentrates on the cost of equity effects of industry 
peer firm earnings quality. Further, prior literature on “information transfers” (Eckbo 
[1983]; Bowen et al. [1983]; Ohlson et al. [1985]; Baginski [1987]; Firth [1996]; Laux 
et al. [1998]) also indicates that peer firms’ expected cash flows are significantly and, 
on average, positively correlated. Information transfer occurs when an information 
event for one firm changes the security prices of other peer firms. Early studies (e.g., 
Foster [1981]) find a firm’s earnings announcement has a statistically significant impact 
                                                          
13
 When a firm makes investment decisions, the firm will weigh the expected returns and the cost of 




on the stock prices of other non-announcing industry peers, consistent with information 
transfer occurring.
14
 Recent studies (Gleason et al. [2008]; Xu et al. [2006]) investigate 
information transfers around earnings restatements. They find that when a firm restates 
earnings, not only the firm but also peer firms face equity market penalties. Durnev and 
Mangen (2009) further find those non-restating firms that experience negative stock 
returns are those with low investment efficiency in the past. Therefore, they conclude 
that a firm’s restatement helps investors to realize other non-restating firms’ past 
investment inefficiency, resulting in revisions in those non-restating firms’ expected 
future cash flows.
15
 In sum, previous studies suggest that industry peer firms’ values are 
correlated, and this is consistent with the major assumption of LLV.  
 
Empirical Studies on Information Quality and the Cost of Equity  
Another line of related literature is the association between a firm’s information 
quality and its cost of equity. Though most of these studies do not directly employ the 
theoretical model developed by LLV, their findings have implications for understanding 
the model’s validity.  
Francis et al. (2004) study the relations between the implied cost of equity and a 
number of earnings attributes.
16
 They find that Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) earnings 
quality measure has the stronger association with the cost of equity. Similarly, Barone 
(2003) notes the cost of equity and the market’s perceived quality of earnings are 
negatively associated. Francis et al. (2005) argue that firms with higher earnings quality 
                                                          
14
 This information transfer occurs because of the industry-level information contained in peer firms. 
15
 Similarly, Sidak (2003) studies the case of the Worldcom accounting fraud. He finds that WorldCom's 
fraudulent financial information led other industry peer firms to significantly overinvest.  
16
 They use seven measures: earnings quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, 
timeliness, and conservatism. 
15 
 
have lower coefficients on Beta in the capital asset pricing model and thus also lower 
cost of equity. Ecker et al. (2006) further show that the correlation between an earnings 
quality factor and the contemporaneous return is affected by a variety of proxies for 
earnings quality. Barth et al. (2013) extends the investigation to earnings transparency 
and find that earnings transparency is significantly negatively correlated with the 
expected cost of equity. 
The studies above indicate that earnings quality is negatively correlated with the 
cost of equity, but other studies provide mixed findings. Cohen (2003) finds no 
association between earnings quality and a proxy for the implied cost of equity after 
controlling for a number of other firm characteristics. Moreover, Core, Guay, and Verdi 
(2008) challenge Francis et al. (2005) by arguing that an association with 
contemporaneous returns (traditional asset-pricing model, e.g., Fama and French 
[1993]) and accruals quality measure cannot provide support to the argument that 
earnings quality is related to lower implied cost of equity.  
Using accounting information quality measures other than earnings quality, prior 
studies also provide evidence that accounting information quality can mitigate the 
implied cost of equity. Botosan (1997), Richardson and Welker (2001)  and Botosan 
and Plumlee (2002) note higher disclosure quality (measured based on the quantity of 
voluntary disclosures in 10k and AIMR scores) leads to lower the cost of equity. 
Botosan’s (1997) findings are limited to firms with low analyst following.
 
Botosan, 
Plumlee, and Xie (2004) extend Botosan (1997) to the precision of information. They 
find that higher public information precision lowers the cost of equity whereas more 
precise private information leads to higher implied cost of equity. Similarly, using data 
16 
 
from the Swiss market, Hail (2002) notes a significantly negative effect of a firm's 
voluntary disclosure policy on its implied cost of equity. Another aspect considered in 
prior studies is the quality of accounting standards. Based on the conjecture that IAS or 
U.S. GAAP are higher quality standards than are German domestic accounting 
standards, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show that adoption of either IAS or U.S. GAAP 
reduces German firms’ cost of equity. Some other studies also investigate information 
risk and uncertainty. For example, Easley et al. (2002) show that stocks with greater 
information asymmetry, measured by a higher probabilities of information-based inside 
trading, face higher cost of equity, measured by realized future return. However, 
Botosan and Plumlee (2013) suggest the findings in Easley et al. (2002) are sensitive to 
using measures of implied cost of equity.  
Studies that specifically test the theoretical model of LLV provide mixed 
evidence.  Using internal control weaknesses (ICWs) under both SOX section 302 and 
section 404 as a proxy for low information quality, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find 
evidence in favor of LLV. They find ICW firms have higher systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and cost of equity, after controlling for several firm characteristics 
and determinants of internal control quality. Subsequent remediations of ICWs lower 
the cost of equity. In contrast, Ogneva et al. (2007) do not find similar results using 
ICW firms that file first-time Section 404 reports. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. use an implied 
cost of equity measure derived from analyst forecast data from ValueLine data. Ogneva 
et al. find the ValueLine measure is negative correlated with realized future return. 
Using alternative implied cost of equity measures based on analyst forecasts from 
I/B/E/S, Ogneva et al. do not find a cost of equity effect of ICW. Based on these 
17 
 
findings, Ogneva et al. attribute the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. to sample 
selection biases. In summary, empirical evidence provided by prior literature is mixed 
with respect to the prediction of LLV that high quality accounting information reduces 
the firm’s cost of equity. 
 
Hypothesis  
As discussed earlier, the financial information of peer firms is useful to investors 
in assessing the covariance of the firm’s cash flows with the cash flows of peer firms. 
Therefore, as the quality (or precision) of peers’ financial information increases, 
investors’ assessment of the firm’s systematic risk decreases (e.g., Dye [1990]; Admati 
and Pfleiderer [2000]; LLV [2007]). I summarize this discussion into the following 
testable hypothesis related to the effects of peer firm earnings quality on the firm’s cost 
of equity (stated in the alternative form): 
 








CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Earnings Quality 
Prior empirical literature (e.g., Biddle et al. [1995]; Liu et al. [2002]) shows that 
earnings is the main source of firm-specific accounting information, so my study uses 
earnings quality as a proxy for information quality. My earnings quality measure is 
based on the model in Francis et al. (2005) which uses a combination of the Jones 
































  (1) 
Where:  
 TACCit    = total accruals for firm i in year t, defined as the difference between 
net income before extraordinary items and operating cash flow, 
 ΔREVit    = change in revenue for firm i in year t, 
 PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t, 
CFOit  = cash flow from operations in year t, 
 TAit = average total assets for firm i in year t. 
              
To estimate earnings quality, I first regress the model above by each industry-
year. The residuals (abnormal accruals) reflect 1) estimation error in a firm’s accruals 
and 2) intentional accrual manipulations by the firm’s management. Therefore, this 
measure meets LLV’s definition of information quality.
17
 Because the magnitude of the 
residuals is an inverse indicator of earnings quality, I use the negative of (five-year) 
standard deviation of the residuals as my measure of earnings quality (EQ), so that 
higher values of EQ indicate higher earnings quality.  
EQ  = Earnings quality, measured by the negative of firm-specific 
five-year standard deviation of residuals estimated from model 
(1). 
 
                                                          
17
 Ng (2011) also use earnings quality measures as proxies for information quality defined in LLV. 
19 
 
Peer Firm Earnings Quality 
Peer firm earnings quality (P_EQ) refers to the equally-weighted or market-
share-weighted (revenue) average EQ of all the other firms in the industry (defined 
based on Fama-French 48 industry classification) except firm i.
18,19
 Higher values of 
P_EQ indicate higher earnings quality of other firms in the industry. 
P_EQew   = Peer firm earnings quality based on equally-weighted EQ of 
all other firms in the same industry during the fiscal year. 
P_EQmsw = Peer firm earnings quality based on market-share-weighted 
EQ of all other firms in the same industry during the fiscal 
year. 
 
By giving the same weight to each observation, P_EQew more closely reflects 
the earnings quality of a typical or average industry peer, but this measure is more likely 
to be affected by small firms with less economic importance. P_EQmsw weighs large 
firms more heavily, and these industry “leaders” may be relatively more important for 
determining assessed covariances (Bratten, Payne, and Thomas [2013]).  
 
Ex Ante Cost of Equity 
I estimate the implied cost of equity using Easton’s (2004) PEG method. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan et al. (2011) examine several different cost of 
equity capital measures and find that Easton’s (2004) measure correlates with all the 
previously known risk measures in theoretically consistent directions. Easton’s (2004) 
implied cost of equity is imputed as follows: 
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 Chan et al. (2007) examine various methods to classify industry peer firms. Their results show that 
Fama-French industry classification consistently outperforms other methods in explaining firm-level 
return co-movement. 
19
 Prior studies (e.g., Leary and Roberts [2014]) also use peer firms’ average value as a measure of a peer 












where EPSj,t+k is the last mean consensus analyst earnings forecast for year t+k for firm 
j. Pj,t is the stock price for firm j. To ensure that investors have impounded information 
in the firm’s and other firms’ annual reports for fiscal year t, following prior studies 





Industry-Adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio 
Following Francis et al. (2005), I use the industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio 
(IndEP) as a summary of a firm’s comprehensive risk and an alternative indicator of the 
cost of equity. A lower earnings-price ratio implies a lower cost of equity, because 
“investors are willing to pay more for a given dollar of earnings” (Francis et al. [2005, 
page 311]). The earnings-price ratio is industry-adjusted, because Alford (1992) finds 
industry peers are a good matched portfolio in terms of operational risk and growth. To 
calculate industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios, I first calculate the earnings-price ratio 
for each firm with positive earnings, measured as the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items divided by the market value of equity.
21
 Then, I calculate the 
median earnings-price ratio for each industry-year.
22
 Finally, for all firms with positive 
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 I use stock price at the end of June (in the calendar year t+1) to make sure that all peer firms’ earnings 
information (in fiscal year t) are available to firm j’s information. Fama and French (1992) discussed the 
advantages and disadvantages of measuring stock prices at the end of June. This timing of stock price 
measurement may not be good for firms with non-calendar fiscal year ends or industries where most 
firms have non-calendar fiscal year ends. In untabulated tests, I also measure stock prices at the end of 
July, August, and September.  My results are generally robust. My results are also not sensitive to using 
only observations with December fiscal year-ends. 
21
 Pj,t is measured at July 1
st
 of the calendar year t+1 (Fama and French, [1992]) . 
22





 I calculate a firm’s industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio (IndEP) as the 
difference between its earnings-price ratio and the median industry-year earnings-price 
ratio. This earnings-price ratio is a positive proxy for the cost of equity.  This measure 
has the advantage of not relying on earnings forecast data to measure the cost of equity 
capital. 
 
Market Risk Factor Test 
As discussed above, the effect of peer firm earnings quality on the cost of equity 
should occur through the market risk. Therefore, my first test uses the four-factor model 
(3) to examine the effect of peer firm earnings quality on a firm’s market beta, the 
loading on market return. The dependent variable in equation (3) is EXRETi.m,t+1, a 
firm’s monthly excess return in month m of fiscal year t+1. The independent variables 
include MKTRF, SMB, and HML which are the market risk factor, size factor, and value 
factor from Fama and French (1993). I also include UMD as a momentum risk factor, 
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23 The option-style valuation model (e.g.,Hayn [1995]; Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]) suggests loss 
firms and low-profit firms are valued based on their adaptation value (book value of equity) rather than 
recursion value (as a function of earnings). Thus, for firms with low profitability, earnings are a less 
important determinant of stock price.   
22 
 
In equation (3), H_P_EQ (H_EQ) is an indicator variable for observations with 
P_EQ (EQ) above the median.
24
 LLV predict non-linear relations between peer firm 
earnings quality and the cost of equity and between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity (see section 5.1 for details). Thus, using indicator variables instead of continuous 
variables alleviates concerns related to non-linearity.
25
   
To test the effect of peer firm earnings quality on market beta, I interact 
H_P_EQ (as well as H_EQ and other control variables) with MKTRF.  The coefficient 
( MKT2 ) on ti,1tm,i, __ EQPHMKTRF   refers to the effect of peer firm earnings quality on 
the market risk. My hypothesis predicts that peer firms’ high earnings quality reduces 
the cost of equity via a firm’s market risk. So, I predict a negative coefficient ( MKT2 < 0) 
on ti,1tm,i, __ EQPHMKTRF   in the equation (3). In addition, LLV also predict a 
negative coefficient ( MKT1 ) on ti,1tm,i, _ EQHMKTRF  . 
To control for differences in firms’ innate characteristics in equation (3), I also 
adopt several control variables from prior literature (see Beaver et al. [1970]; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. [2009]), including LnMV, BM, STDCFO, LEV, and CFO, which 
are measured at the end of fiscal year t.  I include these control variables and their 
interactions with MKTRF. LnMV is measured as the log of firm j’s market value at the 
end of fiscal year t. Banz (1981) finds a significant effect of size (market value) on 
stock return, and large firms are less risky than small firms. Also, portfolio theory 
suggests large firms’ stock prices are more widely held and therefore face a lower risk 
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 The Spearman correlation between H_P_EQ and H_EQ is 0.437. In additional tests, I take measures to 
deal with concerns related to this high correlation. 
25
 Using indicator variables mitigates concerns about model misspecification because it does not force the 
cost of equity to be a cubic, quadratic or any other specific function of peer firm earnings quality. In 
additional tests, I also use other non-linear specifications, such as the square of P_EQ.  
23 
 
of mispricing (e.g., Beaver et al. [1970]; Klein and Bawa [1977]). BM is measured as 
the log of the ratio of firm j’s book value to its market value at the end of fiscal year t.
26
 
Stattman (1980) finds BM significantly explains cross-sections of stock return. Fama 
and French (2003) further suggest BM reflects a firm’s relative distress and future 
earnings prospects. Firms with poor earnings prospects, signaled by low market value 
and high BM, would be penalized by higher cost of equity. LEV is total debt divided by 
total assets at the end of fiscal year t. As a firm’s leverage increases, the earnings stream 
of stockholders become more risky, thus leading to a higher cost of equity (Modigliani 
and Miller [1958]; Beaver et al. [1970]). CFO is cash flow from operations divided by 
average total assets, and STDCFO is the standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations divided by total assets calculated using the most recent five fiscal years. 
CFO is used to reflect a firm’s operational performance, and STDCFO measures the 
volatility of operation. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) suggest firms with better and less 
volatile operating performance are expected to be less risky. The appendix includes 
details on variable measurements. 
 
Implied Cost of Equity Test 
I also use the following equation as the second test of my hypothesis. The 
equation uses the cost of equity as a comprehensive measure of firm risk and tests how 
peer firm earnings quality affects the cost of equity.  
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 By taking the log of book to market ratio, firms with negative book equity are deleted. Firms with 
negative book equity are usually loss firms and thus expected to have poor future prospects. For firms 
with positive equity, a higher book to market ratio suggest a worse earnings prospect (Fama and French 
[2003]). If negative book equity firms are not deleted, book to market ratio will not be a monotonic 
measure of future earnings prospect. Therefore, following Fama and French (2003), firms with negative 





 i,tni,t2i,t10 i,t iablesControlVarδP_EQH +δEQH+δ =δICoE __  
(4) 
The dependent variable in equation (4) is the implied cost of equity. The primary 
independent variables are H_P_EQ and H_EQ.  H1 suggests peer firms’ high earnings 
quality reduces a firm’s risk and cost of equity (i.e., 2  < 0).
27
  Also, according to LLV, 
a firm’s own earnings quality should reduce its risk and cost of equity (i.e., 1  < 0). I 
include all the control variables from equation (3). 
The effect of earnings quality on cost of equity predicted by LLV should be 
captured by “an appropriately specified forward-looking beta and the expected return 
on the market as a whole” (p. 388). To test whether the effect of H_P_EQ on ICoE 
occurs through Beta, I first estimate equation (4) without controlling for Beta. Then, I 
re-estimate equation (4) after controlling for Beta. Betaj,t is estimated based on daily 
returns data over rolling two-year windows prior to the end of year t; the data to 
estimate Beta are from CRSP.  Measuring Beta with ex post returns (instead of forward-
looking information) indicates that measurement error may not allow Beta to fully 
control for the impact of H_P_EQ on ICoE. Therefore, I expect the coefficients 1  and 
2 to be less negative after controlling for Beta (but not necessarily equal to zero as LLV 
would predict). 
 
Industry-Adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio Test 
I employ the following equation (5) to further test my hypothesis. The industry-
adjusted earnings-price ratio (IndEP) is used as an indirect measure of the cost of equity.  
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 The interpretation of the coefficient on H_P_EQ (H_EQ) is the difference in the cost of equity between 





i,tni,t2i,t10i,t iablesControlVarαP_EQH +αEQH+α =αIndEP __  (5) 
Similar to the implied cost of equity test, I expect the coefficient ( 1 ) on H_EQ 
and the coefficient ( 2 ) on H_P_EQ to be negative. Also, I estimate question (5) both 
with and without controlling for Beta. In addition to all the controls variables from 
equation (4), equation (5) further includes Growth, the growth rate of revenue. This is 





CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics 
My sample includes U.S. firms in Compustat, I/BE/S and CRSP from 1994 to 
2010.
28
 I delete observations with missing data to estimate measurements of EQ, P_EQ, 
LnMV, BM, LEV, Beta and other variables. Further, I winsorize the sample at the 1% 
and 99% levels for all continuous variables, except MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD. I 
identify 593,728 firm-month observations for the test of equation (3), 23,017 firm-year 
observations for the test of equation (4), and 40,102 firm-year observations for the test 
of equation (5).  Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. The bottom rows of 
Table 1 decompose the sample distribution across the sample years. The number of 
observations generally increases for the implied cost of equity test from 1994 to 2010. 
For the earnings-price ratio test and the market risk factor test, the number of 
observations is relatively stable across the sample period.  
Panels A, B, and C in Table 2 show the descriptive statistics along with Pearson 
correlations for the implied cost of equity test, the industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio 
test, and the market risk factor test.  The mean EXRET, ICoE and IndEP are 0.009, 
0.127 and 0.006, respectively. These statistics are comparable to prior studies.
29
 The 
average monthly market risk premium (MKTRF) is 0.005, so the annual market risk 
premium is approximately 600 basis points (=0.005
12
). As expected, the sample for the 
implied cost of equity test has higher average LnMV than the samples for the other two 
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 My final sample starts from 1994 because less than 300 firms per year have data to estimate the cost of 
equity measure used in my paper before 1994. These firms do not cover a significant portion of the 
market capitalization.  
29
 For example, statistics about implied cost of equity are comparable to Easton (2004). In 1995, the 
average implied cost of equity for my sample is 0.104, and Easton (2004) reports an average implied cost 
of equity of 0.107 for the year of 1995.  
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tests, because the estimation of ICoE requires data on earnings forecasts by analyst who 
are more likely to follow large firms. The two alternative measures for peer firm 
earnings quality, P_EQew and P_EQmsw, are highly correlated for all the three samples. 
Not surprisingly, EQ is also highly correlated with both P_EQew and P_EQmsw. 
Among others, the negative correlation between LnMV and BM in Panel C is the largest 
(−0.429). None of these correlations are high enough to induce any concerns about 
multi-collinearity. Most importantly, I observe significant and reasonably large negative 
correlations between earnings quality (EQ and P_EQ) and proxies for the firm’s cost of 
equity (EXRET, ICoE and IndEP). 
Further, I employ a variance decomposition method to analyze the time-series 
and cross-sectional variations of ICoE and EQ or P_EQ.
30
  For ICoE (EQ) [P_EQ], I 
find 47%,48%,5% ;(65%,15%, 20%); [67% ,6%, 27%] of the total variation is from 
within-firm variation, cross-firm-within-industry variation, and cross-firm-cross-
industry variation. 
Table 3 shows the sample distribution and (mean) statistics across Fama-French 
48 industries. The three largest industries (based on the number of observations in the 
implied cost of equity tests) are Business Services, Electronic Equipment, and 
Pharmaceutical.  The bottom rows of Table 3 calculate (cross-industry) correlations 
between industry-average EQ (P_EQmsw) and the industry -average values of two 
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 First, for each firm i, I calculate the variances (Var1) of ICoE and EQ or P_EQ within this firm. Var1 
is the within-firm variation for firm i. Then, I add up these Var1s to get the total within-firm variations 
(∑Var1).Second, for each industry j, I calculate the variances (Var2) of ICoE and EQ or P_EQ within 
this industry. Var2 is the within-industry variation for industry j. Then, I add up these Var2s to get the 
total within- industry variations (∑Var2). To get cross-firm-within-industry, I subtract off ∑Var1 from 
∑Var2. Cross-firm-within-industry variation is denoted as ∑Var3= ∑Var2-∑Var1.Third, for the full 
sample, I calculate the total variances (∑Var4) of ICoE and EQ or P_EQ. ∑Var4 is the total variation for 
the sample. To get cross-firm-cross-industry variation, I subtract off ∑Var3 and ∑Var1 from ∑Var4. 




proxies for the cost of equity: ICoE and IndEP. EQ (P_EQmsw) is negatively correlated 




Portfolios Using Sorts on EQ and P_EQ 
In Panel A Table 4, I test differences in ICoE, Beta, and IndEP between equally-
weighted portfolios using sorts based on EQ and P_EQ. In the first column, I sort 
observations based on EQ (measured at the end of year t) into quartiles. Then, I 
calculate the equally-weighted average ICoE, Beta and IndEP for year t. The first 
column shows the portfolio with low EQ (EQ in the bottom quartile). The second 
column shows the portfolio with high EQ (EQ in the top quartile). The third column 
tests the mean difference between the two portfolios using t-statistics. The high EQ 
portfolio has significantly lower ICoE (−0.043), Beta (−0.301), and IndEP (−0.007). 
The second and third columns sort observations based on P_EQ (measured at the end of 
year t) into quartiles.
32
 For both measures of P_EQ, I find the portfolio with high P_EQ 
(P_EQ in the top quartile) have significantly lower ICoE, Beta, and IndEP. For example, 
the portfolio with high P_EQew has a 0.029 lower ICoE, suggesting a 290 basis-point 
lower implied cost of equity. 
Because EQ and P_EQ are highly correlated, I further provide residual sorts in 
Panel B to isolate the effects of EQ and P_EQ. To conduct the residual sorts, I first 
regress ICoE, Beta, and IndEP on EQ, separately.
33
 Then, I obtain the residuals from 
these regressions. Further, for each of the portfolios formed based on P_EQ, I calculate 
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 Results in table 3 are similar if I use P_EQew instead of P_EQmsw. 
32
 The results are similar if the portfolios are constructed annually based on the rank of P_EQ in each 
year. 
33




the equally-weighted average values of the regression residuals. All results remain 
consistent with expectation. Compared to multiple regressions, tests using sorts have the 
advantage that the relation between dependent variables and sort variables are not 
forced to be linear. Thus, results using sorts can complement the multiple regression 
tests later.    
 
Market Risk Factor Test 
The four factor regression is estimated with firm-clustered standard errors in 
Table 5. As in equation (3), the regression includes four common risk factors (market 
factor [MKTRF], size factor [SMB], value factor [HML], momentum factor [UMD]), 
several firm attributes, and their interactions. The first column in Table 5 estimates a 
base model. As expected, I find a significant negative correlation between EXRET and 
H_EQ×MKTRF (−0.229; t-statistics= −15.69), consistent with earnings quality reducing 
a firm’s market risk (Ng [2011]). The second and third columns test the effects of peer 
firm earnings quality. I find significant negative coefficients on H_P_EQ×MKTRF for 
the two alternative measures of H_P_EQ.  The coefficients on H_EQ×MKTRF are still 
significantly negative.  
In columns (a4) to (a7), I split the sample based on whether the market excess 
return is positive or negative. As shown in section 2.2.3, equation (6) from LLV 
suggests the effect of earnings quality and that of peer firm earnings quality are greater 
when the unconditional covariance is greater. Interestingly, recent finance studies (e.g., 
Ang and Chen, [2002]; Hong, Tu and Zhou, [2007]) find most stock returns are more 
highly correlated when the market goes down. Therefore, I expect H_EQ and H_P_EQ 
to have greater impacts on beta when the market goes down. My results show that for 
30 
 
market-level bad news, the coefficients on H_EQ×MKTRF and H_P_EQ×MKTRF are 
highly significant. However, none of these effects are significant for market-level good 
news. Also, using Z-statistics, the coefficient on H_P_EQ×MKTRF is significantly 
more negative for negative market returns at the 1% level (one tail test). In general, 
these findings are consistent with the theoretical framework of LLV. To further relive 
concerns about outliers, untabulated regressions delete penny stocks (with stock prices 
< $5), which are economically less important and also more likely to be affected by 
market micro-structure noises. My results remain robust. Overall, the findings support 
the hypothesis. 
To further highlight the economic significance of my findings, I calculate the 
cost of equity effects of H_P_EQ via the market risk. Panel B details the calculation 
process. Based on section 4.1, the annual market risk premium is about 600 basis points. 
Results in the Panel A suggest that observations with P_EQew (P_EQmsw) above the 
median have a 17.5 (14.5) percent lower market beta. Thus, firms with P_EQew 
(P_EQmsw) above the median have, on average, 105 (87) basis-point lower cost of 
equity.  
 
Implied Cost of Equity Test 
Table 6 shows the estimation results of equation (4) with firm-clustered standard 
errors. To test the possible mediation role of Beta, I first estimate the model without 
controlling for Beta in Panel A, and then Panel B further controls for Beta. In the first 
column, a base model is estimated. Using ICoE as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on H_EQ is −0.006 (t-statistics= −8.84), suggesting that earnings quality 
above median lowers the implied costs of equity by 60 basis points. This effect is 
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consistent with prior studies (Francis et al. 2004) which find a negative effect of 
earnings quality on the cost of equity.  
The second to seventh columns test my hypothesis using H_P_EQ as an 
independent variables. Before controlling for Beta, columns (2) and (5) show significant 
negative coefficients on H_P_EQ for the two alternative measures, consistent with 
expectations.  These results suggest that peer firm earnings quality above the median 
lowers the implied costs of equity by 50 basis points. Interestingly, after including Beta 
as a predictor, coefficients on H_P_EQ reported in columns (2) and (5) become less 
negative and generally insignificant at the conventional level, suggesting that the effect 
of H_P_EQ on ICoE occurs through Beta. However, columns (3) and (6) further show 
the differences between coefficients on H_P_EQ before and after controlling for Beta 
are insignificant at the conventional level. For the other variables, ICoE is negatively 
correlated with LnMV, and CFO and positively correlated with BM, STD_CFO and Lev, 
all consistent with expectations. 
I further use path analyses to test the mediation role of Beta in the relation 
between H_P_EQ and ICoE. I estimate a model with the paths shown in Panel A Figure 
III. The theory would predict the effects of earnings quality and peer earnings quality on 
the cost of equity via Beta to be negative. Consistent with the expectation, I find the 
effects of equally (market share) weighted peer earnings quality on the cost of equity 
via Beta to be −0.018 (−0.016) with p-value= −13.94 (−13.17). These results suggest 
significant mediation effect of Beta.
34
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To further alleviate concerns related to biased analyst forecasts, untabualted 
additional tests delete observations with analyst forecast errors (based on either one-
year-ahead earnings forecasts or two-year-ahead forecasts) in the top and bottom deciles. 
The findings remain robust. Also, my results are robust to further controlling for analyst 
forecast errors.  
In summary, the above findings are consistent with negative effects of a firm’s 
earnings quality and peer firm earnings quality on the implied cost of equity. The results 
are at least partially captured by a firm’s systematic risk.  
Industry-Adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio Test 
Table 7 shows the estimation results of equation (5) with firm-clustered standard 
errors. The dependent variable is IndEP. Similar to Table 6, columns (1) estimates a 
base model. Consistent with expectation, IndEP is negatively correlated with H_EQ 
(−0.006, t-statistics= −11.40). Columns (2) and (5) estimate the model without 
controlling for Beta; columns (3) and (6) further controls for Beta. In columns (2) and 
(5), I find significant negative coefficients on H_EQ and H_P_EQ, suggesting 
observations with P_EQ (EQ) above median have 0.3 (0.4) percent lower industry-
adjusted earnings-price ratios. In columns (3) and (6), all of the negative coefficients 
become less significant after controlling for Beta, though columns (4) and (7) suggests 
the changes in coefficients are insignificant. Collectively, these results are consistent 
with expectations. 
As in the implied cost of equity test, I further use path analyses to test the 
mediation role of Beta in the relation between H_P_EQ and IndEP.  I estimate a model 
with the paths shown in Panel B Figure III. The theory would predict the effects of 
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earnings quality and peer earnings quality on the cost of equity via Beta to be negative. 
Consistent with the expectation, I think the effects of equally (market share) weighted 
peer earnings quality on the cost of equity via Beta to be −0.009 (−0.010) with p-
value=−10.25 (−10.33). These results suggest significant mediation effect of Beta. 
35
 
In the primary analyses above, I deleted observations with negative earnings, 
because the (liquidation) option-style valuation model (e.g., Hayn [1995]; Burgstahler 
and Dichev [1997]) suggests low-profit firms are valued based on their adaptation value 
(book value of equity) rather than recursion value (as a function of earnings). Thus, for 
firms with low profitability, earnings are a less important determinant of stock price. As 
an untabualted additional test, I further deleted observations with profitability 
(measured by ROE) in the bottom decile. My findings remain robust.  
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CHAPTER VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Increasing Nonlinear Effect of Peer Firm Earnings Quality 
In section 2.2.3, equation (6) from LLV details the direct effect of peer firm 
earnings quality. If we further differentiate equation (6) from LLV by peer firm 
earnings quality, we get the sensitivity of a firm’s assessed covariance to peer firm 









































































In Equation (7), the denominator is a positive function of the variance of peer 
firm’s earnings noise Var(εj). Thus, higher peer firm earnings quality (i.e., lower 
variance) would result in a smaller denominator. Consequently, the sensitivity of a 
firm’s assessed covariance to peer firm earnings quality (as in equation 7) is greater for 
higher levels of peer firm earnings quality. In other words, peer firms’ higher earnings 
quality should reduce a firm’s cost of equity at an increasing marginal rate. In Figure II, 
I also provide a 3D plot of equation (6) from LLV. The figure also indicates the same 
non-linear effect as predicted by equation (7). 
Table 8 Panel A and Panel B provide evidence consistent with this non-linear 
effect by using the two alternative measures of peer earnings quality, respectively. I 
split the sample into two subsamples based on P_EQ. Then, in each of the two 
subsamples, I re-estimate equations (3), (4), and (5).
37
 For all three sets of tests, I find 
the coefficients on H_P_EQ are significantly more negative for the subsample with 
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 This equation is numbered equation (7) to avoid possible confusions with equation (6) from LLV. 
37
 For the tests in the two subsamples, H_P_EQ is recoded as 1 when peer firm earnings quality is above 
median in the respective subsample. 
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higher H_P_EQ at 1% level (one tailed Z-test), consistent with expectation of a non-
linear direct effect.  
Moderating Effect of Unconditional Covariance 
Based on equation (7), we can also see the sensitivity of a firm’s assessed 
covariance to peer firm earnings quality is a positive function of the unconditional 
covariances of the firm’s expected future cash flows with that of other firms Cov(Vj,Vk). 
Panels C, D and E of Table 8 provide tests of the role of unconditional covariances. 
Panels C and D of Table 8 splits the sample into two subsamples based on whether a 
firm is a multinational firm or not. Multinational firms are geographically diversified 
and thus likely to have lower covariances with industry peers (i.e. Cov(Vj,Vk)). 
Therefore, I expect the effect to be mitigated by a firm’s multinational operation. For all 
three sets of tests, I find the coefficients on H_P_EQ are generally less negative for 
multinational firms than for domestic firms.
 38,39
 These findings are consistent with the 
effect of peer firm earnings quality as expressed in Equation (7). 
In Panel E of Table 8, I split the sample into two subsamples based on a firm’s 
relative profitability, the rank of a firm’s return on equity with-in an industry-year. 
Using both Cournot and Bertrand competition models, Hao et al. (2011) show a firm’s 
profitability, relative to its industry peers, reduces its stock price covariances with its 
industry peers (i.e. Cov(Vj,Vk)). Therefore, I expect the direct effect to be mitigated by 
a firm’s profitability (relative to industry peers). Panel C of Table 8 finds that the 
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 One exception is the implied cost of equity tests using P_EQew. 
39
 Based on Z-statistics, the difference in the coefficients on H_P_EQ between multinational firms and 
domestic firms is significant at 10% level (one tail) for the market risk factor test and industry- adjusted-
earnings-to-price ratio test. 
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coefficients on H_P_EQ are more negative for the subsample with lower relative 




Other Additional Tests (Untabulated) 
Alternative Implied Cost of Equity Measure  
To mitigate concerns about biased analyst forecasts, I deleted observations with 
large analyst forecast errors in my primary tests. In this section, I further use ICoECS as 
a second measure of implied cost of equity which does not use analyst forecasts as 
inputs. For the calculation of ICoECS, earnings forecasts are generated by a cross-
sectional model adopted from Hou et al. (2012). Hou et al. (2012) find the cross-
sectional-model-based implied cost of equity estimate is a reliable predictor of future 
returns. Specifically, for each year between 1994 to 2010, the following cross-sectional 
model is estimated using the previous ten years (t-10 to t-1) of data:   
itititititititkit eTACCNegEARNEARNDivDumDivTAEARN  6543210   
(8) 
Where EARNit+k denotes the earnings of firm i in year t+k (k=0, 1 or 2), TAit is the total 
assets, Divit is the dividend payment, DivDumit is a dummy variable set to 1 for dividend 
payers and 0 otherwise, NegEARNit is a dummy variable set to 1 for firms with negative 
net income and 0 otherwise, TACCit is total accruals. All of these variables are measured 
on a per share basis (in raw dollar values).  
For each year t during my sample period (1994 to 2010), I compute earnings 
forecasts for the future two years by multiplying the independent variables as of year t 
                                                          
40
 I did not perform the industry-adjusted-earnings-to price ratio test for subsamples split based on 
relative profitability, because as discussed above, the industry adjusted earnings to price ratio by itself is 
not a good proxy for the cost of equity for the subsample of low profitability. 
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with the coefficients from the pooled regression estimated using the previous ten years 
(t-10 to t-1) of data. This procedure ensures that earnings forecasts are out of sample.  
During my sample year, I find 8,563 observations for tests using ICoECS, 
smaller than the sample in my primary tests.
41
 The mean of  ICoECS is 0.137, higher than 
that of ICoE. In unreported tests, I still find significant negative coefficients on both 
H_EQ (−0.026, t-statistics=−8.32) and H_ P_EQew (−0.027, t-statistics=−8.40) [H_ 




Influential Peer versus Similar Peer Firms 
The tests above use all the industry peers in measuring P_EQ. This section 
further asks whether influential peer firms or similar peer firms have greater effects on 
the cost of equity. For each industry-year, I first calculate the quartile rank of my 
sample firms based on market value. Then, a firm’s similar peers refer to other peer 
firms in the same quartile, and influential peers are defined as peer firms in the top 
quartile (with the largest market value). I re-estimates equations (4), (5), and (6) by 
including two variables instead of P_EQ: the equally-weighted average earnings quality 
of influential peers (P_EQinfluential) and that of similar peers (P_EQsimiliar). For the market 
risk factor test [the industry-adjusted tests], the results suggest the coefficients on 
H_P_EQsimiliar ×MKTRF  [H_P_EQsimiliar] is significantly less negative than those on 
H_P_EQinfluential × MKTRF [H_P_EQinfluential] at the 5% level, suggesting that influential 
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 I keep this implied cost of equity measure in my additional test because the sample size is much smaller 
than the primary test sample. 
42
 I did not use this measure in my primary tests, because Hou et al. (2012) find this measure is negatively 
correlated with beta, casting doubt on the reliability of this measure. Consistent with Hou et al., my tests 
also find a negative correlation between Hou et al. cost of equity measure and beta. 
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peers’ earnings quality plays a more important role in determining the cost of equity. 
However, for the implied cost of equity test, the coefficients on H_P_EQsimiliar 
(−0.005,t-statistics=−2.54) and H_P_EQinfluential (−0.007,t-statistics=−3.49) are not 
statistically different. 
Alternative Industry Classification 
My primary industry definition is based on Fama-French 48 industry 
classification, because Fama-French industry classification consistently outperforms 
other methods in explaining firm-level return co-movement (Chan et al. 2007). This 
section further uses two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. SIC codes 
are used by US government agencies (e.g. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) 
to classify industry areas. Untabulated results suggest my results are robust for all tests. 
Robustness Tests 
I examine the sensitivity of my findings to several measurement and 
econometrics concerns: variable specification, model specification, estimation 
procedure, and sample selection process. With respect to variable specification, I use 
alternative definitions of H_P_EQ. For example, H_P_EQ is alternatively defined as 
the top quartile of peer firm earnings quality. I find similar results for the implied cost 
of equity test and the market risk factor test. Also, I use the market-value-weighted 
average of peer firms’ earnings quality. Further, I employ several other alternative 
earnings quality measure specifications (see the appendix II).
43
 In addition, I also use 
two additional measures of earnings predictability (e.g., Dichev, and Tang, 2009): 1) 
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 All the results are robust to using these alternative measures, expect that the industry-adjusted-
earnings-to-price ratio tests are not robust to using Jones and modified Jones models.  
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EarnPred which is the negative of the 10-year standard deviation residuals from a 
model which regress the current year’s earnings onto prior year’s earnings;
44
 2) AFDisp, 
which is the negative of the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecast scaled by 
stock price.
45
 Results suggest the results are generally robust to using AFDisp as an 
alternative measure. For tests using EarnPred as the alternative measure, results are 
only significant for the implied cost of equity tests. With respect to estimation 
procedure and model specification, I repeat my tests by using standard errors clustered 
by firm and year. My results remain qualitatively similar. Further, I control for several 
additional variables: the number of firms in the industry (#Peer), the average LnMV for 
all other firms in the industry (P_LnMV), the average BM for all other firms in the 
industry (P_BM), the average STDCFO for all other firms in the industry (P_STDCFO), 
the average LEV for all other firms in the industry (P_LEV), and the average CFO for 
all other firms in the industry (P_CFO). Untabualted results suggest results are not 
sensitive to these additional control variables for the implied cost of equity tests and 
market risk factor tests.
46
 Finally, I add three additional sample selection requirements: 
1) I truncate the sample at the top and bottom 1% levels for all continuous firm-level 
variables; 2) I delete observations in three industries (i.e., Financial Banking, Insurance, 
and Investment Banking); 3) I delete observations in 2002 and 2008 when the stock 
market declines severely. My primary results are generally robust to these sample 
selection requirements.   
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 I run the regression by firm over the last ten year. 
45
 Arguably, if earnings are more predictable, the disagreement between analysts will be smaller. 
Therefore, AFDisp should be a measure of earnings predictability. 
46
 Unfortunately, the results are insignificant for the industry-adjusted-earnings-to-price ratio test. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS 
First, using Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) as a theoretical basis, I 
predict and provide evidence on a negative association between a firm’s cost of equity 
and industry peer firms’ earnings quality. Second, I find that industry peers’ higher 
earnings quality reduces the firm’s cost of equity at an increasing marginal rate. Third, 
the cost of equity effect of industry peer firm earnings quality is mitigated by 
multinational operations and higher profitability (relative to industry peers). These 
findings are consistent with the theory that industry peer firms’ earnings quality changes 
the cost of equity by affecting investors’ assessed covariance of the firm’s cash flows 
with that of other firms.  
I acknowledge that my study has weaknesses, and I need to make several 
caveats. First, I acknowledge that my arguments rely on the validity of my proxies for 
earnings quality and peer firm earnings quality. My results are robust to using 
alternative measures. Second, like any other archival study, the current study cannot 
control for every potential confounding effect. However, as discussed earlier, testing the 
non-linear effect and the moderating roles of multinational operations or relative 
profitability makes it more difficult to propose alternative arguments and also mitigates 
problems of potential omitted variables (see Rajan and Zingales [1998]; Lang and 
Maffett [2010]). Third, LLV’s theory is applicable to all the firms whose values are 
correlated. My study concentrates on industry peer firms because of the noted 
significant positive correlations between industry peer firms’ values (e.g., Foster 
[1981]). Of course, a firm’s expected cash flows can be correlated with non-industry-
peer firms; rivals’ expected cash flows can even be negatively correlated (Kim, Lagina 
41 
 
and Park [2010]). I leave it for future research to examine the cost of equity effects of 
non-industry-peer firms’ and rivals’ information quality. Finally, Gao (2010) suggests 
the cost of capital may not move parallel with investor welfare. Therefore, in cases 
where the cost of capital moves in opposition to investors’ welfare, readers should 
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APPENDIX  I.  
Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
EXRET = Monthly firm stock return minus the risk free return. 
ICoE = Analyst-based implied cost of equity, measured based on the 









where EPS j,t+k is the last mean consensus analyst earnings per share 
forecast for year t+k for firm j. P j,t is the ending stock price on 
the last trading day of June in the calendar year t+1. Analyst 
forecast data are from IBES.  
IndEP = Industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio, measured as the difference 
between the earnings-price ratio and the industry-year median 
earnings-price ratio.  
EQ = Earnings quality, measured as the negative of the 5-year 
standard deviation of residuals estimated from the 
Francis et al. (2005) model.  
H_EQ = High earnings quality, an indicator variable for 
observations with EQ above sample median. 
P_EQew = Peer firm earnings quality, measured as the equally-weighted 
average earnings quality of all other firms in the same industry 
during the fiscal year. 
P_EQmsw = Peer firm earnings quality, measured as the market-share-weighted 
average earnings quality of all other firms in the same industry 
during the fiscal year. 
H_P_EQew = High peer firm earnings quality, an indicator variable for 
observations with P_EQew above sample median. 
H_P_EQmsw = High peer firm earnings quality, an indicator variable for 
observations with P_EQmsw above sample median. 
Beta = Systematic risk at year t, measured by using the CAPM, estimated 
using daily returns data over rolling two-year windows; I 
require a minimum of 180 daily returns for the CAPM 
estimation. 
MKTRF = Market factor, monthly market excess return. 
SMB = Size factor, the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks.  
HML = Value factor, the performance of value stocks relative to growth 
stocks. 
UMD = Momentum factor, the performance of past winners relative to past 
losers. 
CFO = Cash flow from operations divided by average total assets. 
STD_CFO = Standard deviation of cash flows from operations divided by 
average total assets over the prior five fiscal years. 





BM = The log of the ratio of book value to market value. 
Lev = Leverage, measured as total debt divided by total asset. 






Alternative Specifications of Earnings Quality Measure 
In addition to the earnings quality measure based on Francis et al. (2005), I also 
use the following alternative earnings quality measures.   
First, while my primary measure is the negative of the (five-year) standard 
deviation of the residual from the Francis et al. (2005) model, I also use the negative of 
the absolute value of the residuals from the Francis et al. (2005) model.  
Second, I use the Jones model (A1) and modified Jones model (A2) to predict 









































Where, ΔRECit    = change in receivables for firm i in year t. 
Third, I use an alternative measure of earnings quality based on Kothari et al. 
(2005). Kothari et al. develop a performance matched Jones model (A3) to predict 


























            NIit    = net income before extraordinary items for firm i in year t 
Other variables are defined as in the models above.  
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FIGURE I. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES FRAMEWORK  
 


















This figure summarizes the theoretical framework. Using Lambert Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2007) as the theoretical basis, I demonstrate the following direct and indirect channels 
through which a firm’s cost of equity can be affected by peer firms’ earnings quality. 
The direct effect suggests that peer firm earnings quality directly reduces investors’ 
assessed covariance of the firm’s expected future cash flows with other firms’. The 
indirect effect suggests that peer firm earnings quality affects the cost of equity by 
changing the real distribution of both the firm’s and peer firms’ expected future cash 
flows. The effects on covariance are theoretically non-diversifiable.   
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Expected Future Cash 
Flows 
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FIGURE II. THE DIRECT EFFECT OF PEER FIRM EARNINGS QUALITY  
 
Panel A: 3D Plot for LLV Equation (6) 
 




Based on equation (6) from LLV, this figure illustrates the covariance effects of peer 































































 (LLV: 6) 
In this figure, Var(ε j) is an inverse measure of peer firm earnings quality. Cov(Vj, 
Vk) is the unconditional covariance between  firm j’s and firm k’s cash flows. 
Cov(Vj, Vk|Zj) is the covariance between  firm j’s and firm k’s cash flows 
conditional on peer firms’ earnings information. Further, in the figure, I assume 
Var(Vj) to be 1.  
As we can see in panel A, holding Cov(Vj, Vk) constant, as Var(εj) decreases from 1 
to 0, Cov(Vj, Vk|Zj) decreases at an increasing rate. Then, panel B further shows that 



























FIGURE III. PATH ANALYSES FOR THE MODERATING ROEL OF BETA  
 
Panel A: Path Analysis for the Effect of Peer Earnings Quality on the Implied Cost 











Panel B: Path Analysis for the Effect of Peer Earnings Quality on the Industry–









This figure shows the structure of path analyses to test the role of Beta in 
moderating the relation between peer firm earnings quality and the implied cost of 





















 Market Risk 
Factor Test 






(Firm-month) (Firm-year) (Firm-year) 
Number of observations in Compustat 
from 1994 to 2010 
2,364,624 197,052 197,052 
Less:  Observations with no one-year 
ahead stock return 1,386,076   
Observations with no data to 




Observations with no data to 




Observations with no data to 
calculate earnings quality and 
peer firm earnings quality 318,803 4,476 8,679 
Observations with no data to 
calculate other variables 66,017 2,576 3,150 
Final Sample 593,728 23,017 40,102 
Sample Distribution By Year                          
                             1994 35,931 741  2,532  
1995 35,014 815  2,560  
1996 38,943 923  2,543  
1997 36,065 1,030  2,588  
1998 34,108 1,053  2,430  
1999 32,545 1,039  2,443  
2000 33,568 1,016  2,509  
2001 32,993 1,295  2,242  
2002 32,751 1,350  2,325  
2003 30,655 1,794  2,537  
2004 35,635 1,877  2,725  
2005 43,376 1,838  2,579  
2006 40,858 1,860  2,454  
2007 34,415 1,838  2,254  
2008 36,248 1,583  1,798  
2009 31,805 1,475  1,717  
2010 28,818 1,490  1,866  
Note: This table shows the sample selection process for the three tests.  The bottom rows further show the 
sample distribution across the sample years. The first column shows the sample for the market factor test; 
the second column shows the sample for the implied cost of equity test; the third column shows the 










Sample Description  
Panel A: Sample for Market Risk Factor Test 
  EXRET EQ P_EQew P_EQmsw MKTRF SMB HML UMD Lev LnMV STD_CFO CFO BM 
N 593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  593,728  
MIN −0.956 −1.651 −1.469 −1.130 −0.185 −0.166 −0.129 −0.348 0.056 1.182 0.004 −0.580 −3.113 
MAX 9.497 −0.003 −0.009 −0.008 0.115 0.221 0.139 0.184 0.950 11.240 0.342 0.377 1.198 
MEAN 0.009 −0.143 −0.153 −0.109 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.489 5.793 0.057 0.064 −0.695 
STD.DEV. 0.176 0.250 0.231 0.179 0.047 0.036 0.034 0.056 0.220 2.295 0.058 0.142 0.810 
Pearson Correlations                    
EQ −0.001 1.000            
P_EQew −0.002 0.751 1.000           
P_EQmsw −0.002 0.763 0.950 1.000          
MKTRF 0.294 0.013 0.018 0.019 1.000         
SMB 0.185 −0.009 −0.010 −0.012 0.250 1.000        
HML −0.057 −0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.231 −0.355 1.000       
UMD −0.132 0.014 0.014 0.016 −0.280 0.076 −0.150 1.000      
Lev 0.003 0.094 0.090 0.092 0.005 0.002 −0.001 0.002 1.000     
LnMV −0.030 0.041 −0.063 −0.069 −0.027 0.000 −0.006 −0.007 0.182 1.000    
STD_CFO 0.003 −0.239 −0.079 −0.086 −0.002 0.001 0.006 0.005 −0.193 −0.338 1.000   
CFO 0.002 0.113 0.045 0.043 0.005 0.002 −0.006 −0.009 0.000 0.303 −0.321 1.000  
BM 0.037 0.108 0.080 0.081 0.020 0.031 0.001 −0.039 −0.071 −0.370 −0.155 0.009 1.000 










Table 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Sample for Implied Cost of Equity Test 
  ICoE Beta EQ P_EQew P_EQmsw LEV LnMV STD_CFO CFO BM 
N  23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017   23,017  
MIN 0.019 0.093 −2.016 −1.855 −1.565 0.071 3.465 0.003 −0.498 −3.243 
MAX 0.632 2.522 −0.003 −0.000 −0.011 0.952 11.673 0.287 0.368 0.763 
MEAN 0.127 1.047 −0.172 −0.181 −0.148 0.498 7.199 0.048 0.086 −0.932 
STD.DEV. 0.095 0.513 0.308 0.273 0.230 0.216 1.778 0.048 0.126 0.739 
Pearson Correlations                  
Beta 0.131 1.000         
EQ −0.107 −0.107 1.000        
P_EQew −0.050 −0.129 0.782 1.000       
P_EQmsw −0.048 −0.125 0.769 0.966 1.000      
LEV −0.023 −0.167 0.114 0.114 0.113 1.000     
LnMV −0.376 0.060 0.085 0.018 0.008 0.252 1.000    
STD_CFO 0.288 0.150 −0.220 −0.124 −0.127 −0.270 −0.343 1.000   
CFO −0.377 −0.034 0.090 0.061 0.060 −0.015 0.306 −0.287 1.000  










Note: This table shows the sample descriptive statistics and correlations between variables. Panel A shows the sample for the market risk factor test; Panel 
B shows the sample for the implied cost of equity test; Panel C shows the sample for the industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio test.   
Table 2 (Cont’d)  
Panel C: Sample for Industry−adjusted Earnings−Price Ratio Test  
  IndEP EQ P_EQew P_EQmsw LEV LnMV STD_CFO CFO BM Grow 
N 40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  40,102  
MIN −0.157 −1.527 −1.657 −1.208 0.065 1.656 0.003 −0.171 −2.825 0.003 
MAX 0.247 −0.010 −0.003 −0.008 0.939 11.399 0.259 0.391 0.870 1.657 
MEAN 0.006 −0.138 −0.148 0.118 0.485 6.264 0.048 0.104 −0.747 0.138 
STD.DEV. 0.052 0.245 0.230 0.186 0.210 2.194 0.045 0.093 0.713 0.245 
Pearson Correlations               
EQ 0.040 1.000         
P_EQew −0.002 −0.759 1.000        
P_EQmsw −0.002 −0.756 −0.977 1.000       
LEV 0.069 0.103 0.095 0.103 1.000      
LnMV −0.018 0.011 −0.082 −0.087 0.221 1.000     
STD_CFO 0.057 −0.199 −0.068 −0.076 −0.225 −0.321 1.000    
CFO 0.016 −0.067 −0.052 −0.053 −0.170 0.215 0.035 1.000   
BM 0.108 0.081 0.077 0.086 −0.044 −0.429 −0.094 −0.301 1.000  










Sample Description by Industry 
          Sample for Market Risk Factor Test Sample for Implied Cost of Equity Test Sample for Earnings-Price Ratio Test 
Industry 
N 
Firm-Month EXRET EQ P_EQmsw 
N 
Firm-Year ICoE EQ P_EQmsw 
N 
Firm-Year IndEP EQ P_EQmsw 
 Agriculture  1,924  0.011 −0.040 −0.044 55  0.100 −0.046 −0.048 137  0.015 −0.040 −0.049 
 Food Products  10,970  0.008 −0.056 −0.042 403  0.095 −0.060 −0.053 853  0.003 −0.058 −0.046 
 Candy & Soda  1,688  0.014 −0.045 −0.031 64  0.093 −0.037 −0.034 138  0.005 −0.046 −0.035 
 Beer & Liquor  2,656  0.010 −0.035 −0.029 122  0.082 −0.038 −0.030 206  −0.001 −0.041 −0.034 
 Tobacco  784  0.015 −0.010 −0.013 53  0.086 −0.014 −0.018 67  0.006 −0.013 −0.024 
 Recreation  5,215  0.003 −0.173 −0.116 140  0.130 −0.210 −0.182 342  0.005 −0.235 −0.188 
Entertainment 8,049  0.005 −0.181 −0.152 316  0.112 −0.219 −0.187 523  0.007 −0.186 −0.168 
Publishing  5,523  0.006 −0.057 −0.047 195  0.093 −0.054 −0.053 398  −0.001 −0.053 −0.050 
 Consumer Good  10,950  0.005 −0.046 −0.030 336  0.109 −0.044 −0.031 793  0.003 −0.044 −0.031 
 Apparel  9,365  0.008 −0.058 −0.041 322  0.113 −0.066 −0.052 725  0.005 −0.062 −0.052 
 Healthcare  9,332  0.009 −0.070 −0.039 425  0.118 −0.062 −0.043 711  0.006 −0.068 −0.048 
 Medical Equip  21,226  0.011 −0.144 −0.094 859  0.135 −0.177 −0.121 1,270  0.007 −0.159 −0.116 
 Pharmaceutical  32,931  0.012 −0.295 −0.239 1,584  0.166 −0.335 −0.300 1,348  0.006 −0.297 −0.296 
 Chemicals  12,752  0.008 −0.065 −0.042 585  0.133 −0.064 −0.051 955  0.007 −0.066 −0.051 
 Rubber Plastic  5,592  0.006 −0.055 −0.042 120  0.126 −0.053 −0.043 393  0.004 −0.047 −0.040 
 Textiles  3,361  −0.005 −0.034 −0.032 74  0.154 −0.037 −0.040 198  −0.001 −0.035 −0.038 
 ConstruMaterial 12,206  0.008 −0.167 −0.121 377  0.125 −0.242 −0.167 917  0.003 −0.180 −0.130 
 Construction  6,321  0.007 −0.270 −0.263 233  0.161 −0.454 −0.425 438  0.003 −0.277 −0.302 
 Steel Works Etc  9,183  0.008 −0.055 −0.047 363  0.162 −0.071 −0.059 675  0.010 −0.060 −0.057 
 Fabric Products  2,393  0.010 −0.039 −0.034 32  0.137 −0.037 −0.039 166  −0.001 −0.041 −0.041 
 Machinery  22,946  0.011 −0.208 −0.165 840  0.129 −0.309 −0.242 1,654  0.004 −0.194 −0.168 
ElectrEquipment  11,495  0.007 −0.329 −0.209 364  0.142 −0.314 −0.237 712  0.001 −0.190 −0.148 
 Automobiles  10,178  0.006 −0.080 −0.046 391  0.139 −0.086 −0.058 736  0.005 −0.074 −0.049 
 Aircraft  3,396  0.013 −0.062 −0.039 160  0.093 −0.058 −0.048 269  0.005 −0.069 −0.048 
Shipbuilding  1,112  0.009 −0.013 −0.014 41  0.133 −0.015 −0.015 81  0.013 −0.014 −0.017 
 Defense  1,398  0.015 −0.033 −0.023 67  0.119 −0.031 −0.024 110  0.005 −0.033 −0.028 











Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 Sample for Market Risk Factor Test  Sample for Implied Cost of Equity Test  Sample for Earnings-Price Ratio Test 
Industry 
    N  
Firm-Month EXRET EQ P_EQmsw 
N 
Firm-Year ICoE EQ P_EQmsw 
     N 
Firm-Year IndEP EQ P_EQmsw 
Metals  4,025 0.008 −0.194 −0.169 100  0.146 −0.267 −0.283            187  0.013 −0.319 −0.296 
Mining 3,054 0.009 −0.099 −0.067 108  0.125 −0.082 −0.073            237  0.007 −0.096 −0.063 
 Coal  776 0.020 −0.036 −0.031 38  0.128 −0.036 −0.035               68  0.008 −0.034 −0.033 
 Petroleum  27,758 0.014 −0.215 −0.167 1,129  0.137 −0.147 −0.138         1,874  0.008 −0.146 −0.118 
Utilities  25,465 0.009 −0.012 −0.011 1,108  0.077 −0.013 −0.013         2,093  0.003 −0.013 −0.012 
Comm  17,121 0.007 −0.417 −0.347 833  0.127 −0.553 −0.535         1,185  0.008 −0.437 −0.405 
 Per Services  5,121 0.008 −0.053 −0.042 205  0.114 −0.051 −0.045            391  0.002 −0.049 −0.047 
 Bus Services  61,878 0.010 −0.221 −0.190 2,446  0.128 −0.309 −0.276         3,834  0.009 −0.282 −0.260 
 Computers  24,470 0.013 −0.111 −0.077 882  0.138 −0.103 −0.088         1,386  0.010 −0.105 −0.088 
 Electronic  40,526 0.011 −0.164 −0.131 1,657  0.145 −0.194 −0.177         2,429  0.009 −0.158 −0.140 
 Measuring  15,677 0.014 −0.130 −0.087 566  0.129 −0.129 −0.102         1,031  0.006 −0.109 −0.084 
 Bus Suppli 9,155 0.004 −0.033 −0.023 373  0.141 −0.028 −0.025            631  0.006 −0.032 −0.027 
Container  1,867 0.006 −0.034 −0.035 112  0.122 −0.040 −0.044            153  0.002 −0.038 −0.045 
 Transport  16,232 0.008 −0.049 −0.042 789  0.126 −0.054 −0.049         1,291  0.011 −0.051 −0.046 
 Wholesale  22,837 0.009 −0.135 −0.080 717  0.125 −0.193 −0.154         1,667  0.009 −0.165 −0.126 
 Retail   31,345 0.009 −0.064 −0.037 1,419  0.110 −0.072 −0.043         2,389  0.006 −0.063 −0.042 
 Restaurant 10,829 0.006 −0.094 −0.057 410  0.104 −0.105 −0.082            793  −0.001 −0.095 −0.065 
 Banking  5,346 0.006 −0.052 −0.028 182  0.140 −0.042 −0.030            383  0.015 −0.045 −0.023 
 Insurance  17,966 0.007 −0.036 −0.025 785  0.106 −0.032 −0.024         1,317  0.002 −0.035 −0.025 
 Real Estate  4,736 0.005 −0.207 −0.164 25  0.134 −0.232 −0.229            278  0.001 −0.234 −0.186 
 Trading  18,309 0.011 −0.098 −0.053 403  0.113 −0.115 −0.076         1,279  0.008 −0.106 −0.090 
Other   6,289  0.015 −0.145 −0.075 209  0.119 −0.168 −0.106            391  0.010 −0.141 −0.085 
Total 593,728     23,017       40,102       
     EQ P_EQmsw   EQ P_EQmsw 
Cross−Industry Correlation with ICoE    −0.438*** −0.439***     
Cross−Industry Correlation with IndEP        −0.156*** −0.155*** 
Note: This table shows the sample distribution and the mean of several variables across the Fama-French 48 industries. The bottom rows of the table show the 
cross-industry correlations between different variables. ***, **, and * refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Variable 











Equally-weighted Portfolios Using Sorts 
Panel A: Sorts on EQ and P_EQ 
 




























ICoE 0.147 0.104 −0.043***  0.137 0.108 −0.029***  0.139 0.110 −0.029*** 
Beta 1.181 0.880 −0.301***  1.165 0.831 −0.334***  1.117 0.847 −0.270*** 
IndEP 0.010 0.003 −0.007***  0.007 0.003 −0.004***  0.007 0.004 −0.003*** 
 
Panel B: Residual Sorts on P_EQ 
 
 
Regression with EQ as explanatory variable  P_EQew   P_EQmsw 
 


















ICoE 0.121 −0.003*** −16.60  0.001 −0.013 −0.014***  0.001 −0.013 −0.014*** 
Beta 1.019 −0.163*** −14.28  0.068 −0.193 −0.261***  0.075 −0.177 −0.252*** 
IndEP 0.005 −0.009*** −8.04  −0.001 −0.002 −0.001*  0.000 −0.001 −0.001* 
 
  
Note: This table shows the equally weighted average values of ICoE, Beta, and IndEP across different portfolios. In Panel A, the portfolios are sorted 
based on EQ and P_EQ. In first column, the portfolios are formed based on sorts on EQ. In second and third columns, the portfolios are formed based 
on sorts on P_EQew and P_EQmsw, respectively.  In Panel B, I provide residual sorts to isolate the effect of P_EQ from that of EQ. Specifically, I first 
regress ICoE, Beta and  IndEP on EQseparately. Then, I obtain the residuals from these regressions. Further, for each of the portfolios formed based on 
P_EQ, I calculate the equally weighted average regression residuals. ***, ** and * refer to significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, two 










Market Risk Factor Test 
Panel A. Regression     (  Dependent Variable= EXRET) Good Market−Level News  Bad Market−Level News   
 (a1) (a2)P_EQew (a3)P_EQmsw (a4)P_EQew (a5) P_EQmsw  (a6)P_EQew (a7) P_EQmsw (a6)−(a4) (a7)−(a5) 
H_P_EQ×MKTRF  −0.111*** −0.173*** −0.091** −0.015  −0.174*** −0.129*** −0.083*** −0.114*** 
  (−6.63) (−10.00) (−2.43) (−0.42)  (−6.93) (−5.30) [2.60] [3.73] 
H_EQ×MKTRF −0.229*** −0.175*** −0.145*** −0.132*** −0.170***  −0.140*** −0.163***   
 (−15.69) (−10.86) (−9.13) (−3.63) (−4.63)  (−5.77) (−6.82)   
Lev×MKTRF −0.040 −0.013 0.021 0.168** 0.136  0.181*** 0.151***   
 (−1.01) (−0.33) (0.52) (2.02) (1.64)  (3.33) (2.81)   
LnMV×MKTRF −0.019* −0.019* −0.013 0.093*** 0.089***  0.016 0.011   
 (−1.68) (−1.74) (−1.19) (3.87) (3.68)  (1.02) (0.68)   
STD_CFO×MKTRF 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.086*** 0.087***  0.001 0.002   
 (7.24) (6.58) (6.35) (10.16) (10.28)  (0.14) (0.31)   
CFO×MKTRF 1.735*** −0.849*** −0.820*** 2.001*** 1.991***  1.520*** 1.544***   
 (10.14) (−13.69) (−13.30) (5.25) (5.24)  (6.21) (6.28)   
BM×MKTRF −0.859*** 1.768*** 1.752*** −0.899*** −0.923***  −0.551*** −0.586***   
 (−13.86) (10.31) (10.23) (−6.02) (−6.16)  (−6.26) (−6.66)   
MKTRF 0.595*** 0.567*** 0.544*** 0.132** 0.162**  0.728*** 0.744***   
 (18.22) (17.33) (16.61) (2.05) (2.50)  (16.08) (16.39)   
SMB 0.193*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.158*** 0.160***  0.168*** 0.165***   
 (14.71) (13.76) (13.91) (8.79) (8.86)  (12.86) (12.51)   
HML 0.680*** 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.651*** 0.652***  0.683*** 0.683***   
 (56.99) (56.06) (56.53) (46.99) (46.40)  (48.76) (48.77)   
UMD −0.207*** −0.201*** −0.200*** −0.258*** −0.259***  −0.054*** −0.055***   
 (−30.06) (−29.25) (−29.24) (−28.85) (−28.92)  (−6.33) (−6.39)   
H_EQ −0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.001   
 (−2.46) (1.47) (1.91) (0.57) (0.47)  (1.35) (1.29)   
H_P_EQ  −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.007*** −0.007***  −0.003** −0.003**   
  (−6.58) (−7.92) (−5.83) (−5.46)  (−2.42) (−2.34)   
Lev 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** −0.001 −0.001  0.007*** 0.007***   
 (12.23) (12.03) (12.47) (−0.60) (−0.87)  (8.96) (8.84)   
LnMV 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** −0.000 −0.001  0.018*** 0.018***   
 (5.57) (6.36) (6.88) (−0.14) (−0.39)  (7.24) (7.15)   
STD_CFO −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.004*** −0.004***  −0.003*** −0.003***   
 (−13.47) (−14.53) (−14.63) (−13.67) (−13.64)  (−9.22) (−9.23)   
CFO 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013** 0.012**  0.027*** 0.026***   
 (5.43) (5.57) (5.76) (2.32) (2.23)  (5.77) (5.65)   
BM −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.012 −0.011  −0.015 −0.014   
 (−0.67) (−0.53) (−0.65) (−0.92) (−0.79)  (−1.20) (−1.16)   
Intercept 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.027***  0.015*** 0.015***   
 (13.07) (12.39) (12.23) (12.40) (12.36)  (7.04) (7.02)   
R-squared 0.1106 0.1108 0.1111 0.0465 0.0462  0.0892 0.0890   










Table 5 (Cont’d) 
Panel B. The Effect of H_P_EQ on the Cost of Equity via Market Risk 
 
  
(b1)Marginal Effect on Market Risk 
(Coefficients from Panel A) 
(b2) Risk premium (in basis points) per unit of market risk 
(b3) The effect on the cost of equity (in 
basis points) via market risk 
=(b1) × (b2) 
H_EQ   −0.111 600 −66.6 
H_P_EQew   −0.175 600 −105 
H_P_EQmsw   −0.145 600 −87 
 
Note: This table shows the multiple regression results for the market risk factor test. In Panel A, the first three columns use the full sample. For the last two 
columns, the sample are divided into two subsamples based on whether the market excess return (MKTRF) is positive (good news) or negative (bad news).  Panel 
B shows the economic significances, the effect of H_P_EQ on the cost of equity via market risk. The marginal effects are the coefficients from Panel A. The 
average monthly market risk premium (MKTRF) is 0.005, so the annual market risk premium is 600 basis points (=0.005
12
). t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses, and Z-statistics are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and *  refer to significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, 










Implied Cost of Equity Test 
Panel A: Regressions (Dependent Variable= ICoE)  
 
(1) (2) P_EQew (3) P_EQew (4)=(3)−(2) (5) P_EQmsw (6) P_EQmsw (7)=(6)−(5) 
H_P_EQ  −0.005*** −0.003 0.002 −0.005*** −0.003* 0.002 
 
 (−2.98) (−1.63) [1.14] (−3.15) (−1.79) [1.22] 
H_EQ −0.006*** −0.014*** −0.012***  −0.014*** −0.012***  
 
(−11.40) (−9.01) (−8.07)  (−9.30) (−8.25)  
Beta   0.024***   0.024***  
 
  (13.56)   (13.57)  
Lev 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.050***  0.041*** 0.049***  
 
(8.58) (8.98) (10.77)  (8.92) (10.71)  
LnMV −0.011*** −0.011*** −0.013***  −0.011*** −0.013***  
 
(−19.69) (−19.82) (−22.15)  (−19.84) (−22.15)  
STD_CFO 0.334*** 0.333*** 0.300***  0.334*** 0.300***  
 
(13.85) (13.83) (12.54)  (13.87) (12.56)  
CFO −0.189*** −0.188*** −0.184***  −0.188*** −0.184***  
 
(−20.73) (−20.54) (−20.01)  (−20.56) (−20.01)  
BM 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***  0.017*** 0.017***  
 
(12.94) (13.13) (13.01)  (13.07) (12.96)  
Intercept 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.178***  0.196*** 0.178***  
 
(43.15) (42.69) (36.50)  (42.44) (36.35)  
R-squared 0.2547 0.2552 0.2709  0.2552 0.2709  
N 23,017 23,017 23,017  23,017 23,017  
Panel B: Testing the moderating effect of Beta using path analyses  
 Effect t-statistics      
H_P_EQew  Beta  ICoE −0.018 −13.94***      
H_P_EQmsw  Beta  ICoE −0.016 −13.17***      
Note: This table shows the multiple regression results for the implied cost of equity test. In Panel A, the regressions are estimated without controlling for 
Beta. In Panel B, the regressions are estimated before and after controlling for Beta. Panel B analyze the moderating effect of beta using path analyses. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses, and Z-statistics are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * refer to 










Industry-Adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio Test 
Panel A: Regressions  (Dependent Variable= IndEP)  
 
(1) (2) P_EQew (3) P_EQew (4)=(3)−(2) (5) P_EQmsw (6) P_EQmsw (7)=(6)−(5) 
H_P_EQ  −0.003*** −0.002*** 0.001 −0.003*** −0.002*** 0.001 
 
 (−3.60) (−2.99) [1.32] (−3.53) (−2.84) [1.28] 
H_EQ −0.006*** −0.004*** −0.004***  −0.004*** −0.004***  
 
(−8.84) (−5.52) (−5.17)  (−5.82) (−5.47)  
Beta   0.005***   0.005***  
 
  (6.22)   (6.22)  
Lev 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030***  0.029*** 0.030***  
 
(14.65) (15.00) (15.39)  (14.91) (15.32)  
LnMV 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001***  
 
(5.61) (5.22) (2.89)  (5.23) (2.90)  
STD_CFO 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.097***  0.103*** 0.097***  
 
(10.92) (11.01) (10.26)  (11.01) (10.26)  
CFO 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046***  0.044*** 0.045***  
 
(10.69) (10.75) (11.05)  (10.72) (11.02)  
BM 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014***  0.013*** 0.014***  
 
(21.91) (22.02) (22.31)  (22.00) (22.30)  
Growth 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011***  0.012*** 0.011***  
 
(9.07) (9.06) (8.67)  (9.04) (8.65)  
Intercept −0.019*** −0.020*** −0.020***  −0.019*** −0.020***  
 
(−11.06) (−11.38) (−11.58)  (−11.32) (−11.53)  
R-squared 0.0376 0.0381 0.0396  0.0380 0.0396  
N 40,102 40,102 40,102  40,102 40,102  
Panel B: Testing the moderating effect of Beta using path analyses  
 Effect t-statistics      
H_P_EQew  Beta  IndEP −0.009 −10.25***      
H_P_EQmsw Beta  IndEP −0.010 −10.33***      
Note: This table shows the multiple regression results for the industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio test. In Panel A, the regressions are estimated 
without controlling for Beta. In Panel B, the regressions are estimated before and after controlling for Beta. Panel B analyze the moderating effect 
of beta using path analyses. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and Z-statistics are reported in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by 












Variation in the Cost of Equity Effect of Peer Firm Earnings Quality 
Panel A: Sample Split Based on Peer Firm Earnings Quality 


















H_ P_EQew ×MKTRF −0.161*** 0.001 0.162 H_ P_EQ −0.010*** −0.003 0.007 −0.004*** 0.002** 0.006 
 (−8.86) (0.06) [9.19]  (−5.45) (−1.58) [3.75] (−3.98) (2.05) [6.06] 
H_EQ×MKTRF −0.151*** −0.115***  H_ EQ −0.018*** −0.006***  −0.007*** −0.003***  
 (−6.45) (−5.27)   (−7.40) (−3.32)  (−5.21) (−3.17)  
Lev×MKTRF 0.027 0.086  BM 0.019*** 0.017***  0.014*** 0.013***  
 (0.55) (1.51)   (10.19) (10.06)  (15.32) (17.78)  
LnMV×MKTRF 0.029*** 0.033***  Lev 0.050*** 0.041***  0.028*** 0.030***  
 (5.22) (5.50)   (7.80) (6.83)  (9.60) (12.67)  
STD_CFO×MKTRF 1.863*** 1.502***  LnMV −0.011*** −0.012***  0.002*** 0.000  
 (7.38) (7.02)   (−14.07) (−15.05)  (6.41) (1.56)  
CFO×MKTRF −0.789*** −0.886***  STD_CFO 0.351*** 0.318***  0.080*** 0.115***  
 (−8.91) (−11.23)   (9.84) (10.76)  (5.45) (10.10)  
BM×MKTRF 0.018 −0.006  CFO −0.148*** −0.201***  0.052*** 0.041***  
 (1.22) (−0.39)   (−9.82) (−18.87)  (8.08) (8.39)  
MKTRF 0.543*** 0.652***  Growth    0.011*** 0.013***  
 (12.76) (14.04)      (5.56) (7.44)  
H_EQ 0.001 −0.000  Intercept 0.178*** 0.208***  −0.027*** −0.012***  
 (1.50) (−0.14)   (28.11) (33.62)  (−10.50) (−5.40)  
H_ P_EQew 0.001** 0.001         
 (2.31) (1.05)         
Other Variables YES YES 
  
 
     R-square 0.0939 0.1311 
 
R-square 0.2160 0.2756 
 
0.0342 0.0465 












Table 8 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Sample Split Based on Peer Firm Earnings Quality 


















H_P_EQmsw×MKTRF −0.130*** −0.011 0.119 H_ P_EQ −0.010*** −0.001 0.009 −0.004*** 0.000 0.004 
 (−7.07) (−0.56) [8.51]  (−5.29) (−0.69) [5.43] (−5.05) (0.50) [10.63] 
H_EQ×MKTRF −0.184*** −0.107***  H_ EQ −0.017*** −0.008***  0.006*** 0.003***  
 (−7.48) (−4.89)   (−7.36) (−4.03)  (5.25) (2.85)  
Lev×MKTRF −0.063 0.121**  BM 0.018*** 0.018***  0.014*** 0.014***  
 (−1.30) (2.07)   (9.75) (10.04)  (15.33) (18.07)  
LnMV×MKTRF 0.028*** 0.036***  Lev 0.047*** 0.042***  0.029*** 0.030***  
 (4.97) (6.04)   (7.57) (6.97)  (10.52) (12.43)  
STD_CFO×MKTRF 1.630*** 1.724***  LnMV −0.011*** −0.012***  0.002*** 0.000*  
 (6.72) (7.70)   (−14.48) (−15.25)  (6.32) (1.80)  
CFO×MKTRF −0.911*** −0.855***  STD_CFO 0.348*** 0.322***  0.092*** 0.109***  
 (−10.41) (−10.53)   (10.49) (10.74)  (6.32) (9.34)  
BM×MKTRF −0.018 0.007  CFO −0.166*** −0.198***  0.058*** 0.037***  
 (−1.21) (0.44)   (−12.28) (−18.20)  (8.99) (7.36)  
MKTRF 0.593*** 0.628***  Growth    0.010*** 0.014***  
 (14.09) (13.48)      (5.28) (7.74)  
H_EQ 0.001* 0.001  Intercept 0.182*** 0.207***  −0.028*** −0.012***  
 (1.67) (1.51)   (28.81) (35.08)  (−11.34) (−5.29)  
H_ P_EQmsw 0.001* 0.002***         
 (1.73) (2.73)         
Other Variables YES YES 
  
 
     R-square 0.0903 0.1313 
 
R-square 0.2302 0.2689 
 
0.0352 0.0456 













Table 8 (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Sample Split Based on Multi-national Operations 





















H_P_EQew×MKTRF −0.136*** −0.186*** -0.05 H_ P_EQew −0.005** −0.004 0.001 −0.001 −0.006*** −0.005 
 (−5.26) (−8.20) [2.29]  (−2.37) (−1.25) [0.36] (−1.10) (−5.09) [4.75] 
H_EQ×MKTRF −0.145*** −0.131***  H_ EQ −0.009*** −0.018*** 
 
−0.003*** −0.006*** 
  (−6.45) (−6.11)   (−4.51) (−6.24) 
 
(−2.92) (−5.74) 
 Lev×MKTRF 0.126* −0.007  BM 0.021*** 0.013*** 
 
0.012*** 0.015*** 
  (1.80) (−0.14)   (10.98) (6.54) 
 
(13.02) (18.26) 
 LnMV×MKTRF 0.022*** 0.022***  Lev 0.054*** 0.042*** 
 
0.029*** 0.028*** 
  (3.08) (4.06)   (8.49) (6.07) 
 
(9.98) (11.28) 




  (5.98) (8.48)   (-12.44) (-15.89) 
 
(-0.59) (8.12) 
 CFO×MKTRF −0.793*** −0.838***  STD_CFO 0.337*** 0.362*** 
 
0.079*** 0.119*** 
  (−6.44) (−11.96)   (10.23) (10.28) 
 
(5.41) (10.26) 
 BM×MKTRF 0.038** −0.039***  CFO -0.132*** -0.191*** 
 
0.063*** 0.035*** 
  (1.99) (−2.93)   (-8.72) (-16.30) 
 
(8.77) (7.07) 
 MKTRF 0.671*** 0.521***  Growth 
   
0.013*** 0.011*** 
  (11.43) (13.48)   
   
(6.52) (6.38) 
 H_EQ −0.000 −0.001**  Intercept 0.178*** 0.204*** 
 
-0.014*** -0.030*** 
  (−0.17) (−2.03)   (28.17) (29.84) 
 
(-4.63) (-12.60) 
 H_ P_EQew 0.003*** 0.004***   
       (4.49) (5.99)   
      Other Variables YES YES  
 
     
 R-square 0.09160 0.09160  R-square 0.2325 0.2796  0.04049 0.03869 










Table 8 (Cont’d) 
Panel D: Sample Split Based on Multi−national Operations 






















H_P_EQmsw×MKTRF −0.106*** −0.159*** −0.05 H_ P_EQmsw −0.001 −0.006** −0.005 −0.001 −0.005*** −0.004 
 (−4.21) (−7.22) [2.24]  (−0.59) (−2.20) [2.20] (−1.10) (−5.01) [4.19] 
H_EQ×MKTRF −0.158*** −0.141***  H_ EQ −0.011*** −0.017***  −0.003*** −0.006***  
 (−6.94) (−6.59)   (−5.48) (−6.05)  (−2.92) (−6.06)  
Lev×MKTRF 0.107 −0.027  BM 0.021*** 0.013***  0.012*** 0.015***  
 (1.54) (−0.56)   (10.96) (6.51)  (13.02) (18.19)  
LnMV×MKTRF 0.023*** 0.022***  Lev 0.052*** 0.043***  0.029*** 0.028***  
 (3.13) (4.09)   (8.32) (6.13)  (9.98) (11.28)  
STD_CFO×MKTRF 1.919*** 1.718***  LnMV −0.009*** −0.014***  −0.000 0.002***  
 (6.06) (8.57)   (−12.35) (−15.98)  (−0.59) (8.09)  
CFO×MKTRF −0.803*** −0.862***  STD_CFO 0.337*** 0.363***  0.079*** 0.119***  
 (−6.52) (−12.20)   (10.24) (10.31)  (5.41) (10.30)  
BM×MKTRF 0.035* −0.045***  CFO −0.133*** −0.191***  0.063*** 0.035***  
 (1.82) (−3.34)   (−8.78) (−16.38)  (8.77) (7.13)  
MKTRF 0.686*** 0.531***  Growth    0.013*** 0.011***  
 (11.77) (13.79)      (6.52) (6.42)  
H_EQ −0.000 −0.001*  Intercept 0.179*** 0.203***  −0.014*** −0.030***  
 (−0.21) (−1.81)   (28.56) (29.74)  (−4.63) (−12.46)  
H_ P_EQmsw 0.003*** 0.004***         
 (4.14) (5.07)         
Other Variables YES YES  
 
      
R-square 0.1600 0.09147  R-square 0.2319 0.2800  0.04049 0.03868  













Table 8 (Cont’d) 
Panel E: Sample Split Based on Relative Profitability 









































×MKTRF −0.158*** −0.198*** 0.04 −0.125*** −0.198*** 0.074 H_ P_EQ 0.000 −0.010*** 0.01 −0.001 −0.010*** 0.009 
 
(−8.30) (−7.92) [1.80] (−6.60) (−7.92) [2.25] 
 
(0.11) (−4.03) [3.88] (−0.96) (−3.96) [4.65] 
H_EQ 


































































































 (−4.35) (−15.56) 
 
(−4.30) (−15.62) 













 (33.00) (32.30) 
 
(32.83) (32.09) 











       










       
Other Variables YES YES  YES YES 
  
      
R-squared 0.1290 0.1087  0.1287 0.1087 
 
R-square 0.1117 0.2356 
 
0.1118 0.2356  
N 296,903 296,825  296,903 296,825  N 11,521 11.496  11,521 11.496  
 
70 
Note: This table analyzes variations in the cost of equity effect of peer firm earnings quality. Panel A and 
Panel B test the non-linear increasing effects of peer firm earnings quality. The sample is split into two 
subsamples based on P_EQew and P_EQmsw, respectively. Panel C and Panel D test the moderating 
effects of multinational operation. The sample is split into two subsamples based on whether a firm is a 
multinational firm or not. Panel E tests the moderating effects of relative profitability. The sample is split 
into two subsamples based on relative profitability. The differences in coefficients are tested using Z-
statistics. All the control variables and an intercept are included in each regression, but for brevity, some 
coefficients are not reported. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and Z-statistics are reported in square 
brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  Variable definitions are available in the appendix 
 
